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Abstract
This paper studies how firm-level export performance is affected by Real Exchange
Rate (RER) volatility and investigates whether this effect depends on existing financial
constraints. Our empirical analysis relies on export data for more than 100,000 Chinese
exporters over the 2000-2006 period. We confirm a trade-deterring effect of RER volatility.
We find that the value exported by firms, as well as their probability of entering new
export markets, decrease for destinations with a higher exchange rate volatility and that
this effect is magnified for financially vulnerable firms. As expected, financial development
seems to dampen this negative impact, especially on the intensive margin of export. These
results provide micro-founded evidence that financial constraints may play a key role in
determining the macro impact of RER volatility on real outcomes.
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1 Introduction
The increasing volatility of exchange rates after the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements
has been a source of concern for both policymakers and academics. An increasing number of
countries, both emerging (e.g., China) and developed (e.g., euro area members) have chosen
more or less fixed exchange rate systems as a way to protect themselves from the effects of an
excessive volatility, especially on trade. In a context where firms are risk averse, exchange rate
risk increases trade costs and reduces the gains from international trade (Ethier, 1973). Initial
macroeconomic evidence on the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade has been however
quite mixed, concluding to an effect which is either significant but small or insignificant (see
Greenaway and Kneller, 2007, or Byrne et al., 2008, for a survey). Even Rose (2000), who
finds a very large effect of currency union on international trade, concludes to a small effect of
exchange rate volatility. However, more recent works have emphasized that these results could
be due both to an aggregation bias (Byrne et al., 2008; Broda and Romalis1, 2010) and an
excessive focus on richer countries with highly developed financial markets. Indeed, much more
substantial negative effects of the exchange rate volatility on trade are found for developing
countries (Grier and Smallwood, 2007).
There is still a strong lack of firm-level evidence on the impact of exchange rate volatility
on exporting behavior, and on how this relationship may be influenced by financial constraints,
which are likely to be much stronger and more binding in developing countries. A careful
firm-level study of these relationships may bring us some more clear-cut evidence regarding the
exacerbating role of exchange rate volatility for export costs, and how financial development
may help alleviate these additional costs. This paper aims at filling these gaps. We study the
impact of Real Exchange Rate (RER) volatility on exporting behavior and the way financial
constraints, together with financial development, shape this relationship at the firm level. Our
empirical estimations rely on export data for more than 100,000 Chinese exporters over the
2000-2006 period. China is a highly relevant case for several reasons. Firstly, the country
displays an especially high export rate given it size, leading to substantial exposure to exchange
rate fluctuations. Secondly, China is interesting because it is characterized by a low financial
development, but with a rather high regional heterogeneity, which will be useful to identify a
non-linear effect of exchange rate volatility depending on credit constraints. Finally, the Chinese
1Broda and Romalis (2010) also address the issue on reverse causality between exchange rate volatility and
trade. Once the problem is controlled for, they still find a negative impact of volatility on trade, though reduced.
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yuan was strongly pegged to the US dollar during practically the whole period considered 2,
implying that the volatility we identify is truly exogenous to Chinese economic developments.
We expect a negative impact of exchange rate volatility on trade through an increase in
the variable and sunk costs of exporting. The former effect is implicitly addressed in Ethier
(1973), and is the most intuitive one: exchange rate risk creates an uncertainty for the exporter’s
earnings in its own currency, which is similar to an increase in variable costs. But exchange rate
volatility may also increase the sunk costs of exports, which can be seen as a form of investment
in intangible capital. In practice, most investment expenditures are at least in part irreversible,
i.e. made of sunk costs that cannot be recovered if market conditions turn out to be worse
than expected. The combination of investment irreversibility and asymmetric adjustment costs
induces a negative relationship between price volatility and investment (Pindyck 1988, 1991),
especially in developing economies (see Pindyck and Solimano, 1993). In such a context, high
volatility has consistently proved to reduce growth and investment, especially private investment
(Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aizenman and Marion, 1999; Schnabl, 2007). Bloom et al. (2007)
find similar results within a firm-level framework with partial irreversibility: higher uncertainty
reduces the responsiveness of investment to a firm-level demand shock.
It is however only recently that the macro literature explicitly identified a relationship
between credit constraints and the size of the impact of volatility. Aghion et al. (2009) show
that the local financial development plays a key role in the magnitude of the repercussions
linked to the exchange rate volatility. Relying on a panel of 83 countries over the 1960-2000
period, they show that the negative impact of RER volatility on productivity growth decreases
with a country’s financial development. Within an identical framework, but focusing on foreign
currency (dollar) liabilities, Benhima (2012) shows over a panel of 76 emerging and industrial
countries between 1995 and 2004 that the higher the share of foreign currency in external debt,
the more detrimental to growth exchange rate volatility is. This tends to support the idea that
the effect of RER volatility depends critically on the existence of credit constraints.
The link between volatility and export performance has been mostly investigated using
macro, and less frequently, disaggregated data at the sectoral level.3 Some papers do look at the
impact of the exchange rate on exporting firms (e. g., Berman et al., 2012, on France; Li et al.,
2China defended a pegged exchange rate versus the US dollar until July 2005, when the government decided
to switch to a reference to a basket of other currencies. However, Frankel and Wei (2007) find the de facto
regime remained a peg to a basket that put virtually all the weight on the dollar. Subsequently , some weight
was shifted to a few non-dollar currencies. In any case, the peg was still fairly strong in 2006.
3Some papers look at the impact of exchange rate variations on Chinese trade, including: Marquez and
Schindler (2007), Ahmed (2009), Freund et al. (2011) and Cheung et al. (2012).
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2012, and Park et al., 2010, on China), but they focus on the impact of the exchange rate level
rather than its volatility, and they do not account for the role of financial constraints. Firm-level
studies of the impact of exchange rate volatility on economic or trade performance for developing
countries are scarce. Carranza et al. (2003) find a negative impact of volatility on a sample
of 163 Peruvian firms; Cheung and Sengupta (2012) simultaneously study the impact of RER
variations and volatility on the share of exports-to-sales ratio for a sample of a few thousand
Indian non-financial sector firms, and find support for a negative effect of volatility. When
coming to the role of credit constraints in modelling the impact of RER volatility, especially on
export performance, research is almost nonexistent. To our knowledge, Caglayan and Demir
(2012) is the only firm-level study connecting firm productivity, exchange rate movements and
the issue of access to external finance. Based on a data set of 1,000 private Turkish firms, their
results support a negative impact of exchange rate volatility on productivity growth which is
downplayed by a better access to external finance. We depart from these previous works by
using a much wider data set of firms, by looking at whether firms move their exports away from
partners characterized by higher exchange rate volatility, and more importantly, by investigating
the presence of a non-linear effect of exchange rate volatility on performance depending on the
level of financial constraints, in the Chinese context. The latter is apprehended through two
complementary dimensions. First, we infer firm-level financial vulnerability from the financial
dependence of their activities. This approach was pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
has proved to be a robust methodology to detect credit constraints and assess their evolution
(Kroszner et al., 2006, and Manova et al., 2011). Second, we exploit Chinese cross-provincial
heterogeneity to study how financial development may mitigate both credit constraints and
exchange rate volatility.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on various levels. First, we provide a
micro-founded investigation of Aghion et al. (2009)’s prediction that exchange rate volatility is
especially harmful to firms that have high liquidity needs when local financial development is
low. Second, our methodology allows to circumvent a number of endogeneity problems which
may have flawed some of the related studies. Indeed, the use of firm-level data mitigates
the issue of reverse causality from trade to exchange rate volatility (cf. Broda and Romalis,
2010), and the well-known simultaneity bias between exporting behavior and financial proxies
for credit constraints at the firm-level. It is very unlikely that a Chinese firm shock impacts
exchange rate volatility or measures of financial dependence based on data from US firms.
Besides, using cross-regional data within a single country instead of cross-country data makes
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the risk of confusion between financial development and other macro characteristics less severe.
Third, our results give insight into what the main sources of the apparent lack of macro impact
of exchange rate volatility could be: the level of financial constraints and financial development
appears indeed more important than the aggregation bias to explain this puzzle.
Our results are consistent with the aforementioned macro studies, especially Aghion et
al. (2009): both the value exported and the probability of entering a new export market
decrease for destinations with higher exchange rate volatility. This export-deterring effect is
magnified for financially vulnerable firms: for those most dependent on external finance, a
10% increase in RER volatility decreases the value exported by 14%, and the probability of
entering by 3%. As expected, financial development seems to dampen this negative impact,
especially on the intensive margin of export. These results are robust to various definitions of
trade margins, measures of RER volatility and financial dependence, subsamples, and to the
inclusion of additional controls. We therefore provide micro support to the macro literature
which points at financial development as a key determinant in identifying the impact of RER
volatility on real outcomes.
In the next section, we survey the different theoretical mechanisms underlying our approach,
before discussing our general methodology and presenting our database in section 3. In section
4, we start by presenting the results on the intensive margin, then on the extensive margin,
before introducing some robustness checks and a general discussion of our findings. Section 5
concludes.
2 Exchange Rate Volatility, Financial Constraints and Ex-
ports: Theoretical Underpinnings
Our approach stands at the crossroads of two strands of the literature. Firstly, there is a
rapidly increasing number of papers dealing with the behavior of firms which manufacture
and export several products to several destinations. It is now widely known that aggregate
exports are concentrated in a small number of major players (Eaton et al., 2004) and that large
exporters are involved in exporting more than one product (Bernard et al., 2011; Eckel et al.,
2011). Bernard et al. (2011) show that the proportion of multi-product firms that export, the
number of destinations for each product, and the range of products they export to each market
all increase in response to reduced variable trade costs. Even closer to our work is Berthou
and Fontagné (2013), who document the impact of the introduction of the euro on the export
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decisions of French firms, the number of products exported and average sales per product. Their
results point to a heterogeneous trade creation effect across euro area destinations: for those
firms exporting to destinations characterized by lower monetary policy coordination (that is,
higher exchange rate volatility) before 1999, exports grew by 12.8% following the introduction
of the euro, with 20% of the effect being due to an increase in the number of products exported.
By contrast, no effect arises regarding the decision to export. Conversely, they find a negative
effect on all three definitions of trade margins for euro area destinations with closer monetary
policy coordination before 1999, indicating that the additional competitive pressure did more
than offset the benefits of zero volatility.
Secondly, there is growing empirical evidence that credit constraints impact exporting be-
havior (Greenaway et al., 2007; Berman and Héricourt, 2010; Minetti and Zhu, 2011). These
papers consistently find that the effect is magnified when firms belong to industries relying
more on external finance (Minetti and Zhu, 2011), and in developing countries (Berman and
Héricourt, 2010) compared to developed ones (Greenaway et al., 2007). In a recent paper,
Manova (2013) incorporates financial frictions into a heterogeneous-firm model, before bringing
it to aggregate trade data. She finds that 20%-25% of the impact of credit constraints on trade
are driven by reductions in total (domestically sold and exported) output. Of the additional,
trade-specific effect, one third reflects limited firm entry into exporting, while two thirds are
due to contractions in the sales of exporters. Both extensive and intensive margins are therefore
affected by credit constraints.
Our paper explores the possibility of a negative impact of exchange rate volatility on trade,
proportionally stronger for financially vulnerable firms - and consequently weaker with high
levels of financial development. This can be generated by several mechanisms. One can think
of exchange rate risk creating uncertainty for the earnings of the exporter, which is equivalent
to uncertainty on variable trade costs. The results by Bernard et al. (2011) and Berthou and
Fontagné (2013) show that all trade margins are potentially concerned. The existence of well-
developed financial markets should allow agents to hedge exchange rate risk, thus dampening
or eliminating its negative effect on trade. This effect has not been clearly established, whether
empirically (Dominguez and Tesar, 2001) or theoretically (Demers, 1991), so it is interesting to
see if micro data help deliver clearer insights.
Another mechanism, which is more focused on the sunk costs of exports and therefore
especially fitted for the probability of exporting to new markets, may also be at work. On the
one hand, export capacity may indeed be considered as a type of investment in intangible capital
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(like R&D); on the other hand, exchange rate movements themselves give rise to additional
sunk costs (Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). The negative impact of exchange rate volatility on
exports can be rationalized through the asymmetry of adjustment costs leading to investment
irreversibility. When facing a real depreciation of its own currency, the current earnings of a
firm rise. The firm may use this additional income to fund the sunk costs of entering new
markets. But once these investments are made, it will be impossible to back out and recover
what they cost, even in the case of an abrupt subsequent currency appreciation. If firms are
credit constrained, they will face additional difficulties to fund new investments, and will be
even more reluctant to take the chance to engage in exports to markets characterized by highly
volatile exchange rates.
Several approaches may theoretically rationalize this mechanism. In Aizenman and Marion
(1999), the introduction of credit rationing leads to a nonlinearity in the intertemporal budget
constraint. In their framework, the supply of credit facing a developing country is bounded
by a credit ceiling, independently from the level of demand. The credit ceiling hampers the
expansion of investment in the high-demand state, without moderating the drop in investment
in the low-demand state. Thus, this asymmetric pattern implies that higher volatility reduces
the average rate of investment, and that this effect is magnified with credit constraints. An
alternative mechanism is proposed in Aghion et al. (2009). Suppose an exporter faces fixed
wage costs in the local currency. When the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis that of the exporting
market fluctuates, the exporter cannot completely pass the cost change through to the exporting
market, because of competitive pressures, for example. Then, exchange rate volatility leads to
fluctuations in profits, which can lower investments in an environment where external finance is
more costly than internal finance. Then, following an exchange rate appreciation, the current
earnings of firms decline. This reduces their ability to borrow in order to survive idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks and thereby invest in the longer term. Depreciations have the opposite effect.
However, the existence of a credit constraint implies that in general the positive effects of a
depreciation will not fully compensate for the negative effects of an appreciation. By reducing
the cost of external finance, financial development relaxes credit constraints and consequently
should decrease the impact of volatility on the sunk cost activity, in our case exports.
We can summarize the testable predictions from these models for export performance, that
is both the intensive (the export value) and the extensive (probability of entering the export
market) margin:
Testable Prediction 1. Export performance decreases with exchange rate volatility. Na-
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ming α the parameter of interest, we therefore expect the link between volatility on the one hand
and the exported value and the probability of entering the export market on the other hand, to
be negative: α < 0.
Testable Prediction 2. The negative impact of exchange rate volatility on export per-
formance is magnified for financially vulnerable firms. The sign of the interaction - hereafter
named β - between the volatility of the real exchange rate and financial vulnerability is expected
to be negative: β < 0.
Testable Prediction 3. By relaxing credit constraints, financial development decreases
the impact of exchange rate volatility on export performance, proportionally more for finan-
cially vulnerable firms. The expected signs on both interactions, between volatility and financial
development on the one hand (parameter γ), and between volatility, financial development and
financial vulnerability on the other hand (parameter δ), are positive: δ, γ > 0.
Note also that the relative size and significance of α in comparison with the other parameters
will give us interesting insight into the respective roles of the aforementioned aggregation bias
and heterogeneity in terms of financial development. More precisely, a smaller (or even non-
significant) α compared to β, γ and δ will suggest that the impact of exchange rate volatility
on exports is not unconditional, but emerges mainly because of the credit constraints of firms
and low financial development.
3 Data Sources and Empirical Methodology
3.1 Exchange Rate Volatility
Exchange rate volatility is computed as the yearly standard deviation of monthly log diffe-
rences in the real exchange rate. We compute the real exchange rate as the ratio of the nominal
exchange rate of the yuan with respect to the partner’s currency divided by the partner’s
price level. Monthly data on nominal exchange rates and prices are taken from the IFS. As
a robustness check, we consider two alternative measures of volatility, the two-year standard
deviation of monthly log differences in the real exchange rate and the yearly standard deviation
of monthly log differences from the HP detrended real exchange rate (Hodrick and Prescott,
1997).
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3.2 Trade Data
The main data source is a database collected by the Chinese Customs. It contains Chinese
firm-level yearly export flows by year, HS6 product and destination country, over the 2000-2006
period. It covers 113,368 exporting firms and 158 destinations.
3.3 Financial Vulnerability and Financial Development
We compute the firm-level financial vulnerability as the weighted average of the financial vul-
nerability of its activities, with the weights being the share of the sector in the exports by the
firm in 2000.4
FinV ulnF =
ExportsFs∑
s
ExportsFs
× FinV ulns (1)
We use three different measures of the financial vulnerability of a sector FinV ulns, in line
with other studies on the same topic. These variables are meant to capture the technological
characteristics of each sector which are exogenous to the financial environment of firms, and
determine the degree of reliance of the firms in each sector on external finance. While firms
in all industries may face liquidity constraints, there are systematic differences across sectors
in the relative importance of up-front costs and the lag between the time when production
expenses are incurred and revenues are realized. We capture these differences with a measure
of the external finance dependence in a sector (referred to hereafter as “financial dependence”),
constructed as the share of capital expenditures not financed out of cash flows from operations.
For robustness, we also use an indicator of the asset intangibility of firms. This measure is the
ratio of intangible assets to fixed assets. It thus captures another dimension of the dependence
of a firm on access to external financing: the difficulty to use assets as collateral in obtaining
financing. As a third indicator, we follow Manova et al. (2011) who use the share of R&D
spending in total sales (R&D), based on the fact that as a long-term investment, research and
development often implies greater reliance on external finance.
As is standard practice in the literature, these indicators are computed using data on all
publicly traded US-based companies from Compustat’s annual industrial files; the value of
the indicator in each sector is obtained as the median value among all firms in each sector.
4In unreported results available upon request, we verify that our results hold when measuring the financial
vulnerability of a firm as the financial vulnerability of its main (ISIC) sector of activity, identified as the one
with the greatest export share in 2000.
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Indicators of the financial vulnerability of a sector are available for 27 3-digit ISIC sectors.5 We
borrow the values computed from Kroszner et al. (2006). As explained in Manova et al. (2011),
the use of US data is not only motivated by the lack of data for most other countries, including
China, but it has several advantages. Rajan and Zingales (1998) have pointed out that the
United States has one of the most advanced and sophisticated financial systems, so that the
values for US firms reflect the technology-specific component of external finance needs, or what
can be called the finance content of an industry. It is likely that measuring these indices in the
Chinese context would lead to different values, reflecting the fact that firms organize production
differently in a credit-constrained environment. Thus, such measures would be endogenous to
financial development in China, whereas measures based on data from US firms can be seen as
exogenous in this respect.
In addition to these firm-sector indicators of financial vulnerability, we also use the level of
financial development at the regional level. We thus adapt the methodology first used in Rajan
and Zingales (1998), which consists in filtering the impact of financial liberalization by the
financial vulnerability, in order to isolate its direct finance-related causal effect. We measure
local financial development as the share of total credit over GDP in the province.6
Finally, descriptive statistics of key variables are given in Tables 1 and Tables 2 below.
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Key Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm export value (million US $) 0.75 11.9 0.1 7,440
Start dummy 0.226 0.42 0 1
Nb of products exported 4.66 13.95 1 13299
RER volatility 0.02 0.02 .01 0.44
GDP (trillion US $) 1.54 2.98 0.1 13.7
Price index 234.4 309.8 0.003 3549
Country-sector imports (billion US $) 14.0 28.8 0.01 271
External dependence .37 .26 -0.45 1.14
Intangibility 0.08 0.05 0 0.43
R&D 0.02 0.02 0 0.09
Financial development (total credit/GDP, %) 1.14 0.47 0.58 3.31
5We use a correspondence table between the international trade nomenclatures and the ISIC Rev. 2 cate-
gories, developed at the CEPII to match the Chinese HS 6-digit product codes with the ISIC 3-digit sector
categories.
6In robustness checks, we verified that our results were similar when using the ratio of deposits over GDP.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Vulnerability Indicators
Distribution External dependence Intangibility R&D
5% 0.01 0.01 0.004
10% 0.061 0.019 0.009
50% 0.326 0.074 0.019
90% 0.770 0.149 0.065
95% 0.838 0.160 0.070
3.4 Empirical Specification
We estimate the following specification:
ExportPerfFijt = α RERVolatilityjt + β RERVolatilityjt × FinVulnF (2)
+ γ RERVolatilityjt × FinDevjt + δ RERVolatilityjt × FinVulnF × FinDevit
+ τ FinVulnF × FinDevit + η FinDevit + φZjt + λFj + θt + Fijt
where ExportPerfFijt is a measure of the export performance of firm F in province i for export
destination j in year t. We use two alternative measures of export performance capturing the
intensive and extensive margin of exports respectively, the log of the total free-on-board export
sales towards destination j in year t, and the probability of entering export market j in year
t. Our regressions (performed with the linear within estimator for the intensive margin, and
the conditional logit model for the extensive margin) include firm-country fixed effects λFj and
year dummies θt. Firm fixed effects capture the impact of local endowments and of sector-
specific characteristics (including financial vulnerability). Our conditioning set Z is made of
destination-year specific variables. In standard models of international trade, exports depend
on the destination country’s market size and price index. We use country j’s GDP7 and effective
real exchange rate.8 We also account for country j’s demand for goods of the main sector of
the firms (identified as the one with the highest export share in 2000, the initial year of our
data set). We use the log of the total import value for the country-sector in the year taken
from BACI.9
We first present the results of a benchmark specification with β restricted to 0, which gives
7GDP data come from the World Development Indicators.
8The effective exchange rate is computed from CEPII and IFS data as an average of the real exchange rates
of destination country j toward all its trade partners, weighted by the share of each trade partner in country
j’s total imports.
9This data set, which is constructed using COMTRADE original data, provides bilateral
trade flows at the product level (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010). BACI is downloadable from
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm. Trade flows are aggregated up to the 27 3-digit ISIC sectors
for which our indicators of the financial vulnerability of a sector are available.
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us the unconditional effect of volatility on export performance. In a second step, we condition
the impact of volatility on the financial vulnerability of a firm by introducing an interaction
term between these two variables. Note that the financial vulnerability variable alone does not
appear, since it is captured by the firm-country fixed effects. We further modify our empirical
specification in a third and final step to allow α and β to vary depending on the development of
the local financial sector. In this case, our main parameters of interest are those on the double
interaction between RER volatility and financial development (γ) and on the triple interaction
between RER volatility, financial vulnerability and financial development (δ).
Finally, Moulton (1990) shows that regressions with more aggregate indicators on the right-
hand side could induce a downward bias in the estimation of standard errors. All regressions
are thus clustered at the province level10 using the Froot (1989) correction.
4 Results
We study the joint effects of exchange rate volatility and financial constraints on both margins
of trade, i.e. the size of exports by firm (the intensive margin) and the probability of entering
the export market (the extensive margin) separately.11
4.1 Intensive Margin
Table 3 presents the estimations of the impact of RER volatility on the value exported by
firms. Column (1) reports the estimates of a specification based only on the two proxies for
the destination countries’ market size and price index (which are significant and display the
expected positive signs), and column (2) investigates the unconditional relationship between
RER volatility and export performance. Column (3) includes an alternative measure of market
size, namely the country-sector imports, which appears positive and significant. The follow-
ing columns add a variable interacting RER volatility with a measure of firm-level financial
dependence. Columns (2) and (3) show that exchange rate volatility appears negatively asso-
ciated with export performance (i.e., the α parameter of Equation 2 is significant and negative).
Checking the robustness of this negative relationship with a volatility computed using the yearly
standard deviation of monthly log differences from the HP detrended real exchange rate, co-
lumn (1) of Table 10 in the Appendix confirms a negative impact of RER volatility. Overall, the
10Since the province level is the most aggregated one (i.e., with the smallest number of clusters) in our case, it
gives the most possible conservative standard errors, and appears therefore as the safest choice we could make.
11Robustness checks relying on alternative definitions for both margins are presented in the Appendix.
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unconditional impact of RER volatility on the intensive margin is negative and significant.12
Table 3: Intensive Margin, Exchange Rate Volatility and Financial Constraints
Dependent variable Log Export value (firm-destination-year)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial indicator Ext dep Intang. R&D
RER volatility (α) -0.439a -0.305a 0.402 0.123 0.153
(0.119) (0.106) (0.246) (0.183) (0.172)
Ln country GDP 0.321a 0.312a 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.061
(0.068) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Ln country price index 0.027c 0.027c 0.050a 0.050a 0.050a 0.050a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Ln country-sector imports 0.357a 0.356a 0.357a 0.356a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
RER volatility × -1.900a -5.686a -18.574a
Fin. vulnerability (β) (0.478) (1.466) (4.379)
Fixed effects Firm-country fixed effect
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 3,731,351
Nb of firm-country pairs 1,128,873
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the province level; a, b and c respectively denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Subsequent results suggest that the magnitude of this effect depends on the extent of the
financial constraints. Indeed, columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 show that the interaction with
financial vulnerability enters with a negative and significant coefficient, whatever the indicator
of financial dependence used: external dependence in column (4), asset intangibility in column
(5) and R&D intensity in column (6). Across our three indicators, we observe consistently that
the negative impact of RER volatility on exports grows with financial vulnerability. These
results suggest that the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on export performance is
not unconditional, but is rather proportional to the degree of financial vulnerability.
These results are robust to various robustness checks. First, Table 10 also confirms an
export-deterring effect of RER volatility that rises with financial vulnerability when HP-filtered
RER volatility is used. Second, in unreported results available upon request, we check that the
estimates of Equation 2 are robust to the inclusion of sector-year fixed effects. This allows to
verify that although a large component of the variance in exchange rate volatility may be year-
specific, our results do not solely reflect the sector-specific trends. The results are qualitatively
identical.13
12This result is also robust in specifications based on variables measured using two-year windows. This
additional set of results is available upon request.
13In unreported checks, we show that our results hold when adding interactions between year dummies and
our proxy for financial vulnerability.
13
To illustrate these results, we can compare the decrease in the export performance due
to RER volatility for firms at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the distribution of financial
vulnerability. Table 2 above reports summary statistics on the distribution of the three indi-
cators of financial vulnerability. Using coefficients from column (4) in Table 3 for the intensive
margin, this means that, all things being equal, the negative effect of RER volatility on the
export value is -1.46 [=-1.90 × 0.770] at the 90th percentile of financial dependence compared
to -0.12 [=-1.90 × 0.061] at the 10th percentile. Hence, our results suggest that an additional
10 percent in yearly RER volatility may reduce the export value by 14 percent and 1.2 percent
in the two respective cases.
In Table 4, we check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional controls.
Financial vulnerability is measured using external dependence. We rely on our benchmark
specification from column (4) in Table 3. In column (1), we add the RER level to check that
our measured impact of RER volatility does not simply capture the impact level of RER. The
log of RER enters positively but fails to be significant. In column (2), we add the interactive
term between the level of RER and financial dependence. As expected, the interactive term
attracts a positive and significant coefficient. The reasoning is symmetrical to the one exposed
concerning RER volatility: financially constrained firms disproportionately take advantage of
a depreciating exchange rate.
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Table 4: Intensive Margin: Including RER in Level and Income Volatility
Dependent variable Log Export value (firm-destination-year)
Financial indicator External dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RER volatility (α) -0.308a 0.399 0.223 -0.238c 0.520c 0.504c
(0.103) (0.243) (0.217) (0.125) (0.282) (0.278)
Ln country GDP 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.064 0.063 0.063
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
Ln country price index 0.048a 0.048a 0.048a 0.037b 0.037b 0.037b
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Ln country-sector imports 0.357a 0.356a 0.355a 0.407a 0.406a 0.406a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
RER volatility × Fin. vulnerability (β) -1.901a -1.427a -2.025a -1.981a
(0.479) (0.400) (0.537) (0.523)
Ln RER × Fin. vulnerability 0.465a
(0.141)
Ln RER 0.013 0.014 -0.158a
(0.020) (0.020) (0.046)
GDP volatility -1.721a -1.721a -1.338a
(0.234) (0.234) (0.316)
GDP volatility × Fin. vulnerability -1.057c
(0.565)
Fixed Effects Firm-country fixed effect
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 3,731,351 3,158,760
Number of firm-country pairs 1,128,873 952,132
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the province level; a, b and c respectively denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
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In the remaining columns, we verify that RER volatility does not act as a mere proxy for
economic fluctuations. We look at the repercussions of the volatility of the partner’s GDP. It
is computed as the standard deviation of year-to-year changes in quarterly GDP taken from
the IFS. As argued by Baum et al. (2004) and Grier and Smallwood (2007), foreign income
uncertainty may equally matter for trade. Consistently with their findings, GDP volatility
enters with a negative sign: income volatility has a significant deterrent effect on the value
exported. In columns (4) and (5), we see that this inclusion does not affect our benchmark
result of a negative impact of RER volatility that grows with financial vulnerability. In column
(6), we further include the interactive term between GDP volatility and financial dependence.
It is significant only at the 10% level (the negative impact of income volatility seems to vary,
but only weakly, with the level of credit constraints for a firm), while our main message on the
impact of RER volatility is not altered: the interaction between RER volatility and financial
dependence remains negative and significant.
Table 5 verifies that our results are robust to various changes in the sample. Here again,
financial vulnerability is measured using external dependence. Column (1) restricts the sample
to firms exporting to more than one country while column (2) concentrates on multi-product
firms. The point estimates are virtually unaffected. In column (3), we exclude observations
for Macao and Hong Kong since we are concerned that RER volatility may have different
implications in the case of these two “Greater China” territories than in that of other inter-
national partners. Once again, the negative coefficient on the interactive term between RER
volatility and financial vulnerability remains. In columns (4) to (7), we investigate whether our
results vary across firm-level productivity, proxied as the number of products or the number of
product-country pairs that a firm exports. This is done by regressing our main specification on
subsamples divided around the median of our productivity proxies. Our main findings remain
unchanged in all specifications, indicating that they apply to both low and high productivity
firms.
We now ask whether recent developments in China’s financial system have helped to reduce
the export losses from real exchange rate uncertainty. As previously mentioned, Aghion et al.
(2009) suggest that the effect of RER volatility depends critically on the level of local financial
development. We modify our empirical specification to allow β in Equation 2 to vary depending
on the development of the local financial sector. Our main parameter of interest is that on the
triple interaction between RER volatility, financial vulnerability and financial development (δ
in Equation 2).
17
We first split the provinces into two groups depending on whether their financial development
is below or above the national median or the national mean in 2000 (the initial year of our
sample). The corresponding results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The
positive coefficient attracted by the interactive terms between RER volatility and financial
vulnerability in the case of provinces which are highly developed financially indicate that the
negative effect of RER volatility on the export value of firms is less present when credit is
abundant. In the following columns, we use the time-varying proxy for financial development
and interact it directly with RER volatility and financial dependence; the interaction between
local financial development and financial dependence is also included. We also add the level
of financial development and its interaction with RER volatility (the γ parameter) in columns
(4) and (5). In column (5), we include province-year fixed effects to account for the time-
varying characteristics of the local economy (including financial development, which drops as
a consequence). In this way, any variable correlated with financial development which could
impact the export performance of firms will be captured by these fixed effects, but should not
affect our coefficients of interest (β, γ and δ), unless its effect runs through a financial channel.
Our results confirm our previously measured negative interaction between RER volatility
and financial vulnerability, but suggest that the losses are mitigated by high local financial
development. In all columns, we find that financial development dampens the negative impact of
real exchange rate volatility on exports, the relaxation effect increasing with the level of sectoral
financial dependence of firms: the triple interaction between RER, financial dependence and
financial development is positive and significant. In other words, the positive offsetting effect
of financial development on RER volatility is magnified by the financial constraints for firms.
This result is in line with Aghion et al. (2009)’s observation that financial development reduces
the magnitude of performance deterioration induced by RER volatility. Conversely, there is
no evidence of an effect unconditional on financial constraints: the interaction between RER
volatility and financial development (γ) is insignificant.
As an additional check, we verify in Table 11 in the Appendix that our main results hold
when measuring the intensive margin based on the average export value for the firm-country
pair, computed as the ratio of total export value over the number of products exported (ex-
pressed in natural logarithms). All our key results remain: the negative impact of RER volatility
on the intensive margin increases with the credit constraints for firms, whatever definition of
financial vulnerability is used (columns (2) to (4)). Finally, the relaxing effect of financial de-
velopment also persists (columns (5) to (8)), with an even stronger significance compared to
18
Table 6: Intensive Margin: The Role of Financial Development
Dependent variable Log Export value (firm-destination-year)
Financial indicator External dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RER volatility (α) 0.450c 0.450c 0.312 0.292 0.299
(0.224) (0.224) (0.248) (0.238) (0.228)
Ln country GDP 0.059 0.059 0.057 0.059 0.049
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
Ln country price index 0.050a 0.050a 0.050a 0.049a 0.050a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Ln country-sector imports 0.357a 0.357a 0.356a 0.354a 0.358a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
RER volatility × Fin. vulnerability (β) -2.813a -2.840a -1.718a -1.622a -1.614a
(0.314) (0.329) (0.611) (0.475) (0.462)
RER volatility × Financial vulnerability× 2.034b
High Fin. devt (above median) (0.802)
RER volatility × Financial vulnerability× 2.087b
High Fin. devt (above mean) (0.778)
RER volatility × Financial vulnerability× 7.069a 3.034b 2.878b
Fin. devt (δ) (1.981) (1.234) (1.160)
RER volatility × Fin. Devt (γ) -2.170a -0.666 -0.770
(0.658) (0.457) (0.572)
Financial vulnerability× Fin. Devt 0.263c 0.260c
(0.146) (0.138)
Financial development 0.087 -0.016
(0.061) (0.056)
Province-year fixed effects no no no no yes
Fixed effects Firm-country fixed effect
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 3,731,351
Number of firm-country pairs 1,128,873
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the province level; a, b and c respectively denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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our preferred specification.
4.2 Extensive Margin
In this section, we assess the joint effect of RER volatility and financial constraints on the
extensive margin of trade, i.e. how they affect entry decisions. Columns (1) to (6) of Table 7
replicate Table 3, the explained variable being now the probability for a firm of entering the
export market j, that is, exporting to j in year t, while not having exported to j in year t− 1.
Once again, the unconditional impact of RER volatility (α parameter) appears negative and
significant (columns (2) and (3)), but adding interactive terms with each of our measures of firm-
level financial dependence shows that the magnitude of this effect is conditioned most of the time
by the extent of financial constraints (columns (4) to (6)): the β parameter appears negative
and highly significant, α becoming insignificant except when the financial dependence indicator
is the share of R&D spending in total sales. Quantitatively, the impact of an unconditional 10%
increase in exchange rate volatility (α parameter in column (3)) decreases the probability of
entering by 1.29%.14 Similarly, if we distinguish between firms at the 10th and 90th percentiles of
the distribution of financial vulnerability, we can compare the decrease in the extensive margin
due to RER volatility conditioning on financial vulnerability. Using coefficient β from column
(4), this means that, all things being equal, the negative effect of an additional 10% in RER
volatility on the probability of entering is -3% [(−0.223×0.77)×0.226× (1−0.226)] at the 90th
percentile of financial dependence, compared to -0.24% [(−0.223× 0.061)× 0.226× (1− 0.226)]
at the 10th percentile.
As before, we check the robustness of these results using the yearly standard deviation of
monthly log differences from the HP detrended real exchange rate as an alternative measure of
RER volatility (columns (5) to (8) of Table 10 in the Appendix), leading to similar qualitative
results. In unreported additional checks, we show that our results also hold when adding interac-
tions between year dummies and our proxies for financial vulnerability.15 Overall, the negative
impact of RER volatility on the probability of entry is magnified by financial vulnerability.
14This figure is obtained from the derivative of the choice probabilities (Train, 2003). The change in the
probability that a firm F will choose alternative X (start exporting) given a change in an observed factor ZF,X
entering the representative utility of that alternative (and holding the representative utility of other alternatives
(no exporting) constant) is βZ × PF,X(1 − PF,X), with PF,X being the average probability that firm i will
choose alternative X (start exporting). Based on an average probability to start exporting of 22.6%, our
estimates suggest that the derivative of starting exporting with respect to an additional 10% in RER volatility
is −1.29% = −0.0735× 0.226× (1− 0.226).
15We were not able to implement regressions using sector-year dummies to control more systematically for
sector-specific trends, the latter being too numerous to allow the maximization of the log-likelihood function.
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In columns ((7) to (10)) of Table 7, we check as before the robustness of our results to
the inclusion of additional macro controls, namely the log of RER and GDP volatility. The
RER level enters positively and significantly (column (7)), and its interaction with financial
vulnerability is also correctly signed (positive) and significant (8): financially constrained firms
disproportionately take advantage of a depreciating exchange rate to enter the export market.
In columns (9) and (10), GDP volatility fails to enter significantly, but its interaction with
financial dependence is negative and significant: financially constrained firms are more harmed
by the instability of foreign demand. In any case, these additional estimates do not affect our
benchmark result of a negative impact of RER volatility that grows with financial vulnerability.
Table 8 checks the robustness of these results across various subsamples, financial vulner-
ability still being measured using external dependence. The results are unchanged for multi-
destination (column (1)) and multi-product (column(2)) firms, as well as when observations
for Macao and Hong Kong are excluded (column (3)): the β parameter remains negative and
significant, and entry on the export market is still disproportionately more harmed by exchange
rate volatility in the case of financially constrained firms. This result also holds when we divide
the sample around the median of our proxies for firm-level productivity, the number of prod-
ucts exported (columns (4) and (5)) or the number of product-destinations by firm (columns
(6) and (7)). Interestingly, the unconditional impact of RER volatility on entry (coefficient α)
also remains negative and significant for firms with a low number of products or a low number
of product-destinations: the probability of entry of low-diversified firms is also harmed by RER
volatility, even for a zero financial vulnerability.
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Table 9: Extensive Margin: The Role of Financial Development
Dependent variable Pr(XFi,j,t > 0 | XFi,j,t−1 = 0)
Financial indicator External dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RER volatility (α) 0.246 0.245 0.029 -0.067
(0.267) (0.265) (0.232) (0.215)
Ln country GDP -0.225a -0.225a -0.222a -0.220a
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)
Ln country price index 0.123a 0.123a 0.124a 0.124a
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Ln country-sector imports 0.379a 0.379a 0.379a 0.375a
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
RER volatility × Fin. vulnerability (β) -6.294a -6.560a -2.137a -1.777a
(1.904) (1.930) (0.724) (0.360)
RER volatility × Financial vulnerability× 7.394b
High fin. devt (above median) (3.654)
RER volatility × Financial vulnerability× 7.651b
High fin. devt (above mean) (3.583)
RER volatility × Financial vulnerability× 6.503b -0.072
Fin. devt (δ) (3.000) (1.679)
RER volatility × Fin. devt (γ) -0.866 1.552c
(0.981) (0.813)
Financial vulnerability× Fin. devt 0.590
(0.383)
Financial development 0.358 0.127
(0.230) (0.186)
Fixed effects Firm-country fixed effects
Pseudo-R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Observations 8,801,335
Number of firm-country pairs 1,867,840
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at province level; a, b and c respectively de-
note significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
We complete this overview by examining the impact of local financial development het-
erogeneity on these results. Once again, we measure local financial development as the share
of total credit over GDP in the province, and we perform estimations replicating the ones
presented in Table 6.16 We find that the triple interaction between exchange rate volatility,
financial dependence and financial development (the δ parameter) is positive and significant in
most specifications, whether we consider groups above the national mean/median of financial
development in 2000 (columns (1) and (2)) or use the time-varying proxy for financial devel-
opment (column (3)): the entry into export markets of financially constrained firms is less
hampered by RER volatility when financial development is high. However, in column (4), the
significance switches from the δ to the γ parameter: financial development still reduces the
negative impact of RER volatility, but independently of the level of financial constraints for
firms. Overall, the evidence seems less strong than for the intensive margin, but the presump-
16However, we cannot provide estimations including province-year fixed effects: the maximization of the
log-likelihood function proved to be impossible.
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tion that financial development reduces the magnitude of performance deterioration induced
by RER volatility remains, along the lines of Aghion et al. (2009).
We check how our results behave using the probability of simply being an exporter at
the firm-destination-year level, instead of the probability of entering the export market, as
the definition of the extensive margin. Results which are still based on a conditional logit
specification with firm-country fixed effects are reported in Table 12 in the Appendix. These
results are qualitatively identical to the ones presented in Tables 7 and 9 above: we find some
evidence of an unconditional negative impact of RER volatility (column (1)). This negative
impact is once again magnified by firm-level financial dependence (columns (2) to (4)). Finally,
there is still some evidence that financial development produces a significant relaxation effect
in this context (columns (5) to (8)).
Finally, Table 13 in the Appendix reports the results of an alternative definition of the
extensive margin, namely the (log) number of HS6 products shipped to a country, in the spirit of
Manova et al. (2011). We still find a negative impact of RER volatility on export performance,
which is magnified for financially vulnerable firms. The evidence is much weaker regarding the
relaxing impact of financial development: the δ coefficient is correctly signed (positive), but
fails to be significant.
4.3 Additional Robustness Tests and General Discussion
Our empirical work so far has exploited the variation in export performance over time and across
destinations for firms of different sectors. Since a great proportion of the firms in our sample
export goods to more than one ISIC 3-digit sector, in what follows we also use the variation
across sectors, within firms. Our proxy for the intensive margin becomes the (log) export
value of the firm for a given sector/country pair in a year. The extensive margin is defined
as the (log) number of HS6 products for a given sector/country pair in a year. Otherwise
identical to Equation 2, these regressions include firm-sector-country fixed effects, so that the
coefficients are thus identified purely from the within variation in export performance, across
sector-country pairs, within multi-sector firms. Therefore, our estimates apprehend the way in
which firms choose to allocate their limited financial resources between different sector-country
export markets. This ensures that our results are not driven by some endogenous sorting of
single-sector firms into sectors and export markets for reasons other than credit constraints. The
results are reported in Tables 14 and 15, for the intensive and extensive margin respectively. In
both cases, exchange rate volatility impacts export performance negatively, disproportionately
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more for financially vulnerable firms. There is still a relaxing impact of financial development
for this specific definition of the intensive margin. However, no evidence of such an effect of
financial development can be identified for the range of products exported.
In additional, unreported checks available upon request, we assess the robustness of our
results to the exclusion of the USA as an export destination in the sample. This allows us to
make sure that our results are not biased by the presence of the country toward which volatility
is very reduced by construction during most of the period considered. Similarly, we perform
additional estimates excluding the years 2005 and 2006 to check whether the switch from a
pegging to the US dollar only to a basket of several currencies in July 2005 could impact our
results. In both exercises, our results remain qualitatively identical.
Moreover, we verify that our results hold for exporters irrespective of their ownership struc-
ture (whether domestic or foreign). We also perform estimations on a subsample excluding
intermediary firms. Indeed, our measure of financial constraints may be less relevant for those
firms which do not produce the goods they sell, since it is computed from information based
on production technology. We follow Ahn et al.’s (2011) approach to identify them based on
Chinese characters in the name of the firm which mean “importer”, “exporter”, and/or “trad-
ing” in English. 17 We also estimate specifications adding firm-country level imports from the
countries where the firm is also exporting. In all these checks, once again, the negative impact
of exchange rate volatility appears magnified for financially vulnerable firms, and relaxed by a
high level of financial development.
Finally, we also verify that the differentiated impact of RER volatility depending on financial
development does not simply reflect a correlation between financial development and trade costs.
It could be that provinces with a more developed financial system also benefit from easier and
cheaper international access: in this case, our results may rather identify an uncertainty related
to distance. We replicate our benchmark result looking at the double interaction between RER
volatility and financial dependence (column (4) of Tables 3 and 7) and the triple interaction
depending on financial development (columns (3) and (4) of Tables 6 and 9) when adding
interactive terms with three proxies for the geographical trade advantages that are coastal
location, western location and distance to partner country18, respectively. Our findings of a
trade-deterring effect of RER volatility that is proportional to financial constraints and that is
17In pinyin (Romanized Chinese), these phrases are: “jin4chu1kou3”, “jing1mao4’, “mao4yi4”, “ke1mao4” and
“wai4jing1”.
18We use GeoDist dataset (Mayer and Zignago, 2011), available at:
http//www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
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relaxed by financial development appear fully robust to these controls for geography.
Put together, Tables 3 to 9 shed new light on the joint role of exchange rate volatility and
financial constraints on exporting behavior. Our results suggest that exchange rate volatil-
ity negatively impacts both the intensive (total value exported by firm and destination) and
extensive (probability for a firm of entering a new export destination) margin, but that this
impact is mainly conditioned on the extent of firm-level financial constraints. Our findings
also support the idea that a higher financial development offsets this negative impact, both
for the intensive margin and the probability of entering a new export market - but not for the
range of products exported. Overall, these results give insight into what the main sources for
the apparent lack of macro impact of exchange rate volatility could be: the level of financial
constraints and financial development clearly dominate the aggregation bias hypothesis, since β
and δ are regularly higher and more significant than α. By doing so, we provide micro support
to the macro literature pointing at financial development as a key determinant of the impact
of RER volatility on real outcomes.
5 Conclusion
This paper relies on a firm-level database covering exporters from China to study how export
performance is affected by real exchange rate volatility. Our results confirm a trade-deterring
effect of RER volatility, but suggest that its magnitude depends mainly on the extent of financial
constraints. While firms tend to export less and to reduce their entry into destinations with
higher exchange rate volatility, this negative effect is even stronger for financially vulnerable
firms. Also, financial development appears to dampen this negative impact, especially on the
intensive margin of export.
These results suggest that the development of credit markets would help firms to overcome
the additional export (both variable and sunk) costs related to RER volatility. This could
support the expansion of exports by firms, particularly to those destinations characterized by
RER-related uncertainty. More generally, our study emphasizes that emerging countries should
be careful when relaxing their exchange rate regime. Hard-fixed pegs for developing countries
are certainly not always a panacea, but moving to a fully floating regime without the adequate
level of financial development could also prove to be very hazardous for trade performance.
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Appendix
Table 10: Firm-Country Export Performance and RER Volatility (HP-Filtered)
Dependent variable Log export value (firm-destination-year) Pr(XFi,j,t > 0 | XFi,j,t−1 = 0))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Financial indicator Ext dep Intang. R&D int Ext dep Intang. R&D int
RER volatility (α) -0.210a -0.001 -0.082 0.010 -0.179b 0.298 0.807a 0.064
(0.074) (0.142) (0.109) (0.117) (0.078) (0.229) (0.132) (0.266)
Ln country GDP 0.131b 0.063 0.063 0.063 -0.206a -0.207a -0.207a -0.206a
(0.056) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Ln country price index 0.049a 0.049a 0.049a 0.049a 0.122a 0.122a 0.122a 0.122a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Ln country-sector imports 0.348a 0.357a 0.357a 0.356a 0.381a 0.381a 0.383a 0.381a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
RER volatility × -0.553b -1.517c -9.162a -1.323c -12.335a -10.881
Fin. vulnerability (β) (0.203) (0.836) (2.196) (0.676) (1.511) (12.622)
Fixed effects Firm-country fixed effect
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Observations 3,730,205 8,801,335
Number of firm-country pairs 1,128,105 1,867,840
Notes: Volatility is computed as the yearly standard deviation of monthly log differences from the HP
detrended real exchange rate. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the province level; a, b and c respectively denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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